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Joint Banking Account of Husband
and Wife in Pennsylvania
The rapidly increasing use by husband and wife of the
medium of a single banking account to care for the needs
of both justifies some study of this device and its legal
consequences. Since tenancies by entireties are recognized
in Pennsylvania in personalty as well as in realty, in choses
in action as well as choses in possession, the situation at
once suggests this species of property holding. Whether
or not these deposits do create such tenancies with the in-
cidents attached by law thereto will be discussed herein.
Not the least of the inducements leading to the crea-
tion of tenancies by entireties is the immunity that such
property enjoys from the reach of legal process used for
the collection of debts of either husband or wife. Not even
the expectancy of survivorship is subject to judicial sale
on a judgment secured against one of the tenants. The
property can be reached only by those creditors who have
joint claims against both tenants. This exemption is a
necessary conclusion from the general principle that no-
thing can be taken in execution and sold as the property
of a debtor except property over which the debtor has the
right of disposition by sale or otherwise.' A necessary
correlary of this principle would seem to be that if the
debtor has such right of disposition, such property can be
taken in execution for his debts. To these principles there
can be no valid dissent. In a true tenancy by entirety there
can be but joint control in disposing of the property and
hence it is exempt from execution for the debts of the
individual tenants.
These principles are clearly applicable to one character
of single banking account created by or in the names of
husband and wife. If the single account be created in the
'Beihl v. Martin, 236 Pa. 519 (1912); impliedly overrules Mc-
Curdy v. Canning, 64 Pa. 39 (1870); Alles v. Lyon, 216 Pa. 604 (1907).
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names of husband and wife, presumptively a tenancy by
entireties is created.2 This tenancy has not been abolished
by the Act of March 31, 1812,3 nor affected by the acts re-
lating to the rights of married women. If in such account
there is no agreement that it shall be subject to being
drawn on by either, the law will automatically apply the
rule of joint control in tenancies by entireties, and only
checks signed by both will work an acquittance of the bank.
Such a case is the recent one of Milano v. Fayette Title
and Trust Co., 96 Pa. Super. Ct. 310 (1929). There the ac-
count was in the names of husband and wife. The bank
honored the check of the husband alone and was later sued
for refusal to honor a check signed by both. The latter
check was refused on the ground that the prior check of
the husband had exhausted the account. The court cor-
rectly held that the account was a tenancy by entireties
and that there could be no disposition of the account by
the act of one only.
The other character of single account that is encount-
ered more frequently presents more difficult problems.
Such accounts are those in the names of husband or wife,
or if in the names of husband and wife, there is an agree-
ment in the creation of the account, that either may draw
thereon. This type may or may not be accompanied, in
addition, by a stipulation that the fund is to become, on
the death of one, the property of the survivor. Do these
accounts create tenancies by entireties with the resulting
exemption from execution attachment for the debts of one
or do they create some other character of holding that has
no such exemption as an incident? If it does create a
tenancy by entireties, will the law remove the exemption
from involuntary disposition for debts of one since the
tenants have by agreement removed the necessity of joint
disposition of the account when voluntarily done?
Can there be a concurrent holding by husband and wife
other than as tenants by the entireties? That they might
2Parry's Estate, 188 Pa. 33 (1898).85 Sm. L. 395; 2 Purdon (13th ed.) 2031.
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hold interests in severalty created in them when husband
and wife has long been recognized.4 For many years, the
cases were uniform and without exception, that there could
be no concurrent holding by husband and wife, of any
property created in them while married, other than a ten-
ancy by entirety. They could not hold as tenants in com-
mon nor as joint tenants no matter how clearly such in-
tention was expressed.5 The reason invariably given was
that such was an unalterable rule of law founded on the
rights and incapacities of the matrimonial union. It was
said that if such a holding were a tenancy in common, it
could have none of the chief incidents of such tenancy:-
right to compel partition; liability to reciprocal actions of
waste and of account; liability to an action of ejectment;
the husband could not sell free of dower of the wife; the
wife could not sell her interest at all without the consent
of her husband. Such an estate was a legal impossibility.
There was but one person in the eyes of the law-not the
two necessary for a tenancy in common or joint tenancy.6
With the dawn of the new century some doubt was
expressed by the Supreme Court as to the correctness of
this holding due to the weakening of the marital unity fic-
tion by the Married Women's Property Acts.7 The Court,per
Mitchell, J., said that the severance of this unity destroyed
the reason for the rule. It was left as an open question
whether husband and wife might not hold in common, if
that were the actual intent.
A later case still allowed the question to remain un-
settled, finding that if such were the rule, the intention
'Young's Estate, 166 Pa. 645 (1895). Here there was an assign-
ment of a mortgage to husband and wife "as tenants in common".
By a strained construction of the assignment, it was held that each
took a one-half interest in severalty. See also Rhode's Estate, 232
Pa. 489 (1917).
sJohnson v. Hart, 6 W. & S. 319 (1843); Stuckey v. Keefe's Ex-
ecutors, 26 Pa. 397 (1856); Diver v. Diver, 56 Pa. 106 (1867); McCurdy
v. Canning, 64 Pa. 39 (1870); and many other cases.
SStuckey v. Keefe's Executors, 26 Pa. 397 (1856).
TMerritt v. Whitlock, 200 Pa. 50 (1901).
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was not sufficiently shown by conveying to a husband and
wife "jointly". 8
In the case of Blease v. Anderson," there was a con-
veyance to a husband and wife and the deed expressly
provided "that there is hereby conveyed to the said William
Anderson an undivided ten-fifteenths part and an undivided
two-fifteenths part to the said Rhoda Anderson", the latter
already being a tenant in common with the grantor of an
undivided three-fifteenths part. The Court said, "At no time
since the recent legislation conferring full competency upon
married women to take and hold real estate as their indi-
vidual property, have we ruled that a conveyance to husband
and wife granting distinctly defined, undivided parts or indi-
vidual estates to each, must be construed to create an estate
by entireties notwithstanding the expressed intention of
the grantor to the contrary; far from so holding, all our
decisions upon the subject point in the other direction.
In the case at bar we concur in the conclusion reached by
the learned court below that the grantees did not take by
entiTeties but that each took an individual interest or estate
in the property in question, as particularly provided in the
deed".
It has been suggested that due to the italicized words,
(the italics are our own), the case is authority only for
cases with its peculiar facts, i. e., cases where distinct parts
are granted to each or where one is already a tenant in
common of the property. With this suggestion, we cannot
agree. The case discloses that it was the intention of the
grantor that controlled. The method adopted was merely
one of several that might have been used with like results.
It can also be said, that if the marital unity does not pre-
vent the husband and wife from holding as tenants in
common in one instance, it cannot in another where the
same intention is differently expressed. The case is clearly
authority for the statement that the legal unity has been
so far severed by recent legislation that husband and wife
gHetzel v. Lincoln, 216 Pa. 60 (1906).
9241 Pa. 198 (1913) per Moschzisker, J.
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may hold as tenants in common if such be the intention.
If they may take as tenants in common, surely they may
take as joint tenants if such be the intention. Such is the
law of other states with similar legislation.'0 Blease v.
Anderson has apparently not been referred to in Pennsyl-
vania since it was decided. It has been cited by one court
in another jurisdiction."
We may conclude then, that in Pennsylvania, whether
or not a concurrent ownership by husband and wife is a
tenancy by entireties, a tenancy in common or a joint
tenancy depends on the intention shown in the creation of
such ownership. The presumption will still exist that con-
current ownership of property is to be a tenancy by entire-
ties unless the contrary is shown. Those cases decided prior
to 1913 that held that the expression "jointly" was insuffi-
cient to prevent a tenancy by entireties from arising,'
2
would doubtless continue to be the law to-day, especially
in view of the loose usage of the term "jointly".'3 Many
of the other cases can no longer be considered as au-
thority.1"
Where a bank account is created in the names of
husband and wife, with an agreement that either may
draw, what is the effect of the Blease case? One of the
most important incidents of a tenancy by entireties is the
absence of separate control. If the parties stipulate, in the
creation of an estate, that one of the vital ear-marks of
such a tenancy is not to be present, but that instead one of
the legal incidents of a tenancy in common or joint tenancy
is. to be present, can there be any doubt that they are
'0Taylor v. Lowencamp, 145 Atl. 329 (N. J. 1929); State v. Rahl,
124 S. E. 566 (N. C. 1924); Myers v. Comer, 234 S. W. 325 (Tenn.
1921).
"Goodman v. Greer, 105 Atl. 380 (Del. 1918), where it is cited
as holding that husband and wife may hold as tenants in common.
This case is an excellent one reviewing the authorities in various
states, all reaching the same conclusion.
12 Hetzel v. Lincoln, 216 Pa. 60 (1906) and others.
' 3 Pa. Trust Co. v. Mischik, 96 Pa. Super. Ct. 255, at 258 (1929).
14Stuckey v. Keefe's Executors, 26 Pa. 397 (1856) and others.
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thereby intending to create a joint tenancy rather than
one by entireties? The matter lies completely in their
hands and they impress upon the ownership a vital char-
acteristic of a joint tenancy. 15 Their intention should con-
trol.16 Suppose they stipulate for separate checking and
call it a tenancy by entireties? As usual, the name it is
called should not control but the legal intention as shown
by the separate control.
One objection that may be pressed against such a con-
clusion is that the Act of March 31, 1812,'7 will then affect
the joint tenancy and remove the right of survivorship.
But the mere fact that such will be the case is not a valid
objection. Such was the purpose of the Act. The Act,
moreover, does do more than raise a presumption against
such survivorship, leaving the parties free to stipulate for
the presence of such a right.18 Those accounts stipulating
for separate checking and making provision for survivor-
ship will thus create a joint tenancy with survivorship.
Several of the recent cases may be easily explained on this
ground, although it is true that several contain expressions
that such a holding is one by entireties. 19 If there be par-
ticular solicitude for this right of survivorship as between
husband and wife, it might be held, and surely with no more
straining than in many of the cases already decided under
15See Marble v. Jackson, 139 N. E. 442 (Mass. 1923) for an ob-
jection to calling it a joint tenancy. The objection is the ability to
end the tenancy without consent by withdrawing all of the funds.
But such consent has been given at the creation. The case is incon-
clusive and calls the estate a "quasi" joint tenancy.
"6See Watts v. Horn, 30 Pa. Dist. Repts. 325 (1920). In this case
the Allegheny County Court holds that unity of control and unity in
conveying or encumbering it are vital requisites of a tenancy by
entireties. Such being absent, it was not such a tenancy and was
subject to attachment on a judgment against one only.
175 Sm. L. 395; 2 Purdon (13th ed.) 2031..
"aArnold v. Jack's Admr., 24 Pa. 57 (1854); Redemptorist's Fathers
v. Lawler, 205 Pa. 24 (1903) and Mardis, Adm'rx. v. Steen, 293 Pa. 13
(1928). See also Yard's Appeal, 86 Pa. 125 (1878).
'9Donnelly's Estate, 7 Pa. County Court Repts. 196 (1889); Blick
v. Cockins, 252 Pa. 56 (1916); Klenke's Estate, 210 Pa. 572 (1905);
Sloan's Estate, 254 Pa. 346 (1916).
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the Act of 1812, that since this right of the survivor to
the whole of the property has been present in all concur-
rent holdings of husband and wife prior to 1913, the bare
fact that the joint tenants are husband and wife is suffi-
cient to rebut the presumption created by the Act. This
secures to them survivorship and separate control but does
not permit the free use of the funds immune from execu-
tion by individual creditors. We merely suggest this pos-
sibility and do not advocate it. It should be held, logically,
that survivorship is not present unless it is provided for
in the creation of the account.
Another situation already suggested is where the ac-
count is in the names of husband or wife and nothing is
said about separate checking. We would reach the same
conclusion as where it was in the names of husband and
wife with a stipulation for separate checking. Certainly
the use of the word "or" sufficiently discloses an intention
to allow the account to be drawn on by either, it is a con-
current holding, and should create a joint tenancy. 20 Parties
should not be permitted to choose those incidents of a ten-
ancy that they think desirable and reject those at their
pleasure that are undesirable to them. Getting separate
control, they should hold their interest subject to execution
by separate creditors. Why may either withdraw the
whole deposit at will and yet a creditor not be able to at-
tach the same? Certainly the law is not attempting to
create another kind of "spendthrift trust" for husband and
wife, although if immunity from execution is allowed it
will be such in essence. No valid reason for such an ano-
moly can be seen. The conclusions outlined above seem
to meet that objection.
It is interesting to note that another method of ap-
proach has been used in a recent case on the last character
of account discussed. In Penn'a Trust Co. v. Mischik, 96
Pa. Super. Ct. 255 (1929) there was a savings account in the
20Kennedy's Appeal, 60 Pa. 511 (1869) inadvertently speaks of a
tenancy under the Act of 1812 as a tenancy in common. There is a
real distinction between joint tenancies and tenancies in common and
the Act does not make such into tenancies in common.
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names of "Annie, Andrew Mischik, either". They were
husband and wife. The Court concluded that the account
was held as tenants by the entireties. It was then decided
that being such a tenancy it was not subject to the separate
control of one but could be affected only by a joint act.
The Court, at the conclusion of the case, called the wife a
joint tenant, not using the term in its literal significance.
Instead of calling the account a joint tenancy and subject
to separate checking, it was held a tenancy by entireties
without the right of separate checking. Such a holding is
preferable to one holding it a tenancy by entireties and yet
permitting separate checking. We can see no justification,
however, for ignoring the clearly expressed intention to
permit separate checking by the use of the word "either".
The intention should control and surely the word "either"
is not superfluous. The construction should be toward
other tenancies than one by entireties, if possible.
The Supreme Court cases on this subject have all been
concerned with the question of survivorship and not with
the attempts of a creditor to attach the account. In one
case, the lower court was affirmed per curiam and it had
used the expression, in dealing with a case of husband and
wife but "subject to the order of either or the survivor",
joint owners and joint tenants with survivorship.2 In an-
other, deposits in the names of husband and wife and hus-
band or wife were both treated as tenancies by entireties
for the purpose of survivorship.2 2  In another securities
were held in the joint names and they were held to belong
to the survivor.23  The Supreme Court has never had
presented to it for decision cases dealing with the rights of
attaching creditors as to such accounts and their holdings
as to survivorship are therefore not conclusive on our
problem.
A Superior Court case intimates that a valid contract
may be made to relieve a tenancy by entireties of the pe-
2lBlick v. Cockins, 252 Pa. 56 (1916). Italics added.
22Klenke's Estate, 210 Pa. 572 (1905).
23Rhode's Estate, 277 Pa. 450 (1923).
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culiar incident of joint control3' The case is very incon-
clusive and does not discuss the real effect of such an agree-
ment as possibly miking it a joint tenancy.
The specific problem here considered has been before
several lower courts for decision. As might be expected,
the courts have not been unanimous in their answer to the
problem. All, h6wever, disclose a keen appreciation of the
anomoly of permitting individual checking with immunity
from attachment for individual debts.
The first case holding such an account subject to indi-
vidual debts was that of Watts v. Horn" arising in Alle-
gheny County. The account was in the names of husband
and wife, subject to withdrawal on the check of either or
both. Judgment was secured against the husband and
execution attachment served on the bank as garnishee.
The bank then permitted withdrawal of most of the balance
on a check of the wife alone. The court, relying on an
Indiana case," held that unity of control and unity in con-
veying or encumbering it were essentials of a tenancy by
entireties; that since such unities were lacking by reason
of the right of disposition given to each in the creation of
the account, it could not be a tenancy by entireties. The
court adopted the test of dispositive power to determine
liability to attachment and held that the attachment was
valid although it did not decide whether the account was a
tenancy in common, joint tenancy or interests in severalty.
The same court, in a later case,2 7 impliedly confirms the
previous holding. Here the account was held to be a ten-
ancy by entireties, the agreement being "to pay out on
check oxi receipt of us". The court says the result would
have been different had the account been subject to the
individual check of either.
The Lackawanna County Court has reached the same
24Fredrick's Estate, 54 Pa. Super. Ct. 535 (1913).
2530 Pa. Dist. Repts. 325 (1920).
28Chandler v. Cheney, 37 Ind. 408.
27Osterling v. Van Arsdale, 70 Pitts. L. J. 971 (1922).
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conclusion.2 8 Here the account was in the names of hus-
band or wife. It was held that the account was subject to
the check of either; that it was not a tenancy by entireties
and that the amount of a note made by the husband could
be charged against the account.
The earliest lower court decision on the subject held
that such an account was exempt from attachment for the
debt of one alone.20 The case arose in Philadelphia County.
The account was in the joint names of husband and wife;
either could draw thereon and survivorship was provided
for in the agreement with the bank. It was held that this
created a tenancy by entireties and that it was not subject
to attachment for the debts of the husband alone. It will
be noted that the case was decided when our decisions were
all to the effect that husband and wife could hold con-
currently only as tenants by entireties. It is an excellent
example of what we contend is a joint tenancy with sur-
vivorship created by agreement.
The decision making out the best case for such an ac-
count creating a tenancy by entireties arose in Washington
County.30 The Court makes an objection to our theory,
that appears at first glance to be unanswerable. Cummins,
J., says, "the fact that neither husband or wife can dispose
of any part is not the criterion to determine whether, when
they hold jointly, they hold by entireties, but is a conse-
quence which necessarily follows when they take jointly".
The use of the word "jointly" is unfortunate as tending to
confusion of ideas. The word "concurrently" is free from
this objection. The objection that we are using a result
of an established tenancy to determine whether such ten-
ancy exists would be real were the foundation for the objec-
tion substantial. As clearly shown by the decision, that basis
is that the existence of a tenancy by entireties is not a
matter of intention but necessarily follows by operation of
2 8Pilewsky v. Dickson City National Bank, 24 Lack.. Jurist 9
(1922).
29Donnelly's Estate, 7 Pa. County Court Repts. 196 (1889).
80Zelt v. Washington National Bank, 4 Pa. Dist. and County
Repts. 746 (1923).
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law from unity of person. It also states that husband and
wife can not be tenants in common or joint tenants but if
they held jointly (concurrently) they must be tenants by
the entireties. These basic principles utterly ignore the
existence of the case of Blease v. Anderson. That such is
not the law today is too clear for argument. Hence the
basis on which the case and its objections to our arguments
rests is entirely mythical, since whether it is to be a ten-
ancy in common, a tenancy by entireties or a joint tenancy
is solely a matter of intention. The law annexes to each
tenancy certain legal characteristics. These cannot be ac-
cepted or rejected at the will of those creating the interest.
In determining the intention as to the character of tenancy
created what safer criterion could possibly be used than
looking at which of these immutable incidents they have
stipulated shall be present?
This case also says that assent to the disposal of the
concurrent property by one only, may be by parol and
may be made before as well as at the time of disposal.
The argument must be that there is really joint and not
individual control of the account in such cases. The argu-
ment is unique but untenable. When husband and wife join
in a conveyance of realty held as tenants by the entireties
neither one is thereby assenting to separate disposition by
the other. Which is assenting and which is separately
controlling? The argument ignores actualities. It is ex-
actly what it appears on its face to be-joint control.
The rules in respect to such tenancies first developed in real
property tenancies and such rules were taken over bodily
when such tenancies were recognized in personalty. If it
is joint control in realty, it requires a similar method in
personalty. joint control is required and not mere assent
to separate disposition by the other tenant. If the rule
be as asserted by the Court, will the law permit assent to be
given to separate voluntary disposition and deny the valid-
ity of the assent as to involuntary disposition? If assent
be given to separate voluntary disposition does the law not
automatically make such assent available to creditors?
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Certainly the entire policy of the law, with rare excep-
tions such as the "spendthrift trust", is that where one has
power of disposition generally, the property is also sub-
ject to process in favor of creditors.3 Hence the decision
rests on fallacious reasoning and should not be followed.
The only other case found discussing the problem arose
in Dauphin County in 1924.32 This involved an account on
which either husband or wife could draw. By considering
the principles involved, the Court thought that the account
could not be one by the entireties. The Court felt con-
strained, however, to follow what it conceived the necessary
results of Supreme Court decisions 33 and held that the ac-
count was owned as tenants by the entireties and as such was
not subject to attachment for a debt of the husband alone.
The Court failed to consider the effect of Blease v. Anderson,
which was decided after the first Supreme Court case relied
upon by the Court. As has been suggested, the effect of the
Blease case on situations of this character has never been
considered by the Supreme Court nor has the problem been
presented except on the issue of survivorship. This lower
court case, then, affirms our conclusions on principle and
its following of supposed Supreme Court cases to the con-
trary which were not dealing with the same problem is
of questionable soundness.
In still another case3" the account was in the names
of husband or wife. The husband attempted to assign part
of the account as collateral security for the payment of
money borrowed. The Court held that the account was a
joint deposit (apparently meaning a tenancy by entireties)
with right of survivorship and denied validity to the assign-
ment. The same objections may be made to this decision
31Beihl v. Martin, 236 Pa. 519 (1912).
32Williams v. Bross, 4 Pa. Dist. & County Repts. 496 (1924).
33Klenke's Estate, 210 Pa. 572 (1905) ; Sloan's Estate, 254 Pa. 346,
349 (1916); also citing Fredrick's Estate, 54 Pa. Super. Ct. 535 (1913)
and Donnelley's Estate, 7 Pa. County Court Repts. 196 (1889).
834Roka v, Wilbur Trust Co., 10 Dist. & County Repts. 94 (1927).
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as to several of the cases before discussed.35
In a case arising in another jurisdiction,86 a deed was
made to husband and wife, "jointly and severally in equal
moieties". The issue was the right of the survivor to claim
the whole estate. The Court said that it was either a
tenancy in common or a joint tenancy, not deciding which
one of the two. This was unnecessary as there was no
survivorship in joint tenancy. The case would seem to
express the law of Pennsylvania today in a similar situa-
tion.
In summary, we conclude :-that husband and wife may
hold concurrently as tenants in common or joint tenants;
that in single bank accounts of husband and wife where
the right of separate checking is provided and where the
account is husband or wife, that 'a joint tenancy is thereby
created; being such, it is subject to attachment for the
debts of either; and that the appellate decisions apparently
to the contrary are not controlling on this problem. If
such be not the conclusions of the courts, the situation can
be made tolerable only by action of the legislature in mak-
ing such accounts subject to execution attachment for sep-
arate debts.
35Ignores intention of parties to have separate control as shown
by use of word "or"; fails to consider effect of Blease v. Anderson.
36Myers v. Comer, 234 S. W. 325 (Tenn. 1921).
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